Category: Cardholder Data

Magnetic-Stripe Data

Also known as: Track Data, Magstripe Data, Track 1/Track 2 Data

Simply put

Magnetic-stripe data is the information stored on the dark magnetic strip on the back of a payment card, which a reader retrieves when the card is swiped. This data is static, meaning it does not change from transaction to transaction, which makes it easier for fraudsters to copy and use to create counterfeit cards. Because full track data is highly sensitive, it must not be retained after a payment is authorized.

Formal definition

Magnetic-stripe data refers to information encoded on the magnetic material of a payment card and read at the point of interaction, typically organized into Track 1 and Track 2 (and, less commonly, Track 3) formats used to facilitate payment processing and verification. The full contents of a track (full track data) constitute sensitive authentication data under PCI DSS and must not be stored after authorization, even in encrypted form; this is distinct from cardholder data elements such as the PAN, cardholder name, expiration date, and service code, which may appear within track data but are governed by different storage and protection rules when handled outside of full track context. Because magnetic-stripe data is static, it is more susceptible to skimming, cloning, and replay than dynamic authentication mechanisms such as EMV chip authentication; practitioners should confirm applicable storage prohibitions and control language against the current published PCI DSS version, as requirement numbering and wording vary across versions.

Why it matters

Magnetic-stripe data represents one of the highest-risk data elements in the payment ecosystem because the full contents of a track constitute sensitive authentication data under PCI DSS. Unlike some cardholder data elements that may be stored under defined controls, full track data must not be retained after a payment is authorized, even in encrypted form. Storing prohibited track data is a common finding that expands PCI DSS scope and increases the potential impact of a compromise, since a single exposed record can contain everything a fraudster needs to attempt a counterfeit transaction.

The core problem is that magnetic-stripe data is static: the information encoded on the stripe does not change from transaction to transaction. This makes it comparatively easy to lift through skimming and to replay by cloning onto a counterfeit card. By contrast, EMV chip authentication is intended to introduce dynamic data that is harder to replay, which is why the industry has moved toward chip-based interactions. However, adoption, fallback behavior, and regional practices vary, and magnetic stripes remain present on many cards, so the risk associated with track data persists.

For security and compliance teams, the practical significance is twofold: prevent the storage of full track data anywhere in the environment after authorization, and treat any system that captures, transmits, or could inadvertently retain track data as in scope for appropriate controls. Because requirement numbering and wording differ across PCI DSS versions, practitioners should confirm the applicable storage prohibitions and control language against the current published standard rather than relying on a fixed reference.

Who it's relevant to

Merchants and Point-of-Sale Operators

Any merchant accepting swiped card payments handles magnetic-stripe data at the point of interaction. They must ensure that their POS systems and card readers do not retain full track data after authorization, since improper storage can significantly expand PCI DSS scope and increase breach exposure. Where available, encouraging chip-based interactions may help reduce reliance on static stripe data.

Payment Processors and Acquirers

Processors and acquirers transmit and process track data during authorization and are responsible for handling it in accordance with applicable PCI DSS requirements. They play a role in validating that connected merchants and downstream systems do not store prohibited sensitive authentication data, and in supporting technologies that reduce the persistence of track data in their environments.

Security Engineers and Compliance Officers

These practitioners are responsible for confirming that no full track data is stored after authorization anywhere in the environment, including logs, debug output, and temporary files where such data can be inadvertently captured. Because requirement numbering and wording vary across PCI DSS versions, they should validate applicable storage prohibitions and control language against the current published standard.

Fraud Analysts and Merchant Risk Teams

Because magnetic-stripe data is static and can be skimmed and cloned, fraud teams monitor for indicators of counterfeit card use associated with compromised track data. Understanding the distinction between static stripe data and dynamic EMV chip authentication helps inform risk models, though no single control eliminates fraud, and detection approaches involve trade-offs between false positives and false negatives.

Inside Magnetic-Stripe Data

Track 1 data

One of the data tracks encoded on the magnetic stripe, capable of holding the primary account number (PAN), cardholder name, expiration date, service code, and discretionary data. Its full contents, when read from the stripe during a transaction, constitute sensitive authentication data.

Track 2 data

The track most commonly used in payment processing, encoding the PAN, expiration date, service code, and discretionary data in a more compact format than Track 1. Full track 2 contents read from the stripe are sensitive authentication data.

Full track (equivalent) data

The complete track data read from the magnetic stripe, or its equivalent read from a chip. Under PCI DSS this is classified as sensitive authentication data and must not be retained after authorization, even if encrypted.

Embedded cardholder data elements

Individual elements such as PAN, cardholder name, expiration date, and service code are present within the track. When handled outside the context of full track data, PAN and certain elements are treated as cardholder data, which may be stored under defined controls, unlike the full track itself.

Service code

A value within the track that indicates acceptance conditions and usage constraints for the card. As an element of full track data it forms part of sensitive authentication data when read from the stripe.

Discretionary data

Issuer-defined data on the track that can include values used to support card verification. As part of the full track, it falls within sensitive authentication data and must not be stored after authorization.

Common questions

Answers to the questions practitioners most commonly ask about Magnetic-Stripe Data.

Is it acceptable to store magnetic-stripe (full track) data after authorization if it is encrypted?

No. Full track data is sensitive authentication data, and PCI DSS prohibits storing sensitive authentication data after authorization even when it is encrypted. Encryption changes how data is protected but does not change its classification or the storage prohibition. This differs from certain cardholder data elements, such as the PAN, which may be stored after authorization under defined controls. Confirm the specific requirement wording against the current published version of PCI DSS, as numbering and phrasing differ between versions.

Isn't magnetic-stripe data the same thing as the PAN and other cardholder data?

No. The magnetic stripe's full track data is a distinct category. While track data contains the PAN and other elements, the complete track image is treated as sensitive authentication data, not simply cardholder data. Cardholder data (such as PAN, cardholder name, expiration date, and service code) may be stored under defined controls, whereas full track data must not be retained after authorization. Conflating the two can lead to prohibited storage and a compliance failure.

How can we confirm our systems are not inadvertently retaining full track data after authorization?

Review data flows and storage locations, including application databases, logs, debug and trace files, temporary files, memory dumps, and error-handling output, since track data is sometimes retained unintentionally in these places. Data-discovery scanning and pattern searches can help locate track-formatted data, though such tools may produce false positives and false negatives and should be validated against your environment. Document findings and confirm remediation against the current published PCI DSS requirements rather than a fixed requirement number.

What should we do if we discover stored full track data during an assessment?

Treat it as prohibited stored sensitive authentication data and prioritize secure deletion using a method appropriate to the storage medium. Investigate the root cause, for example an application, logging, or error-handling process that captured it, and remediate that source so the condition does not recur. Retain evidence of remediation for your assessment. Consult your acquirer, card brand rules, and where applicable your QSA regarding any reporting obligations, as those obligations are governed by network and brand rules that vary by region and change over time.

Does using truncation, masking, or tokenization on the PAN address the requirement not to store full track data?

No. Those techniques transform or reduce the PAN, but they do not authorize retaining full track data, which must not be stored after authorization regardless of any transformation applied to individual elements. Truncation, masking, hashing, and tokenization each affect data differently, and their effect on PCI DSS scope depends on how they are implemented and validated, not on the label alone. The prohibition on storing full track data is independent of these controls.

Which technologies can reduce or remove full track data from our environment?

Approaches such as point-to-point encryption solutions and tokenization can, depending on implementation, reduce the systems that handle or could inadvertently store track data, and thereby help reduce scope. However, scope reduction depends on the specific solution, its configuration, and its validation, not on the technology label. P2PE is governed by its own PCI standard separate from PCI DSS, so confirm which standard applies to a given control and validate the outcome for your specific environment.

Common misconceptions

Full magnetic-stripe (track) data can be stored after authorization as long as it is encrypted.

Full track data is sensitive authentication data, which must not be stored after authorization even when encrypted. Encryption changes how data is protected but does not make retention of sensitive authentication data permissible.

Magnetic-stripe data and cardholder data are the same thing and follow the same storage rules.

Full track data is sensitive authentication data and is subject to the prohibition on post-authorization storage. Individual elements such as PAN, cardholder name, expiration date, and service code are cardholder data and may be stored under defined controls, but that permission does not extend to the full track itself.

Because EMV chip and other authentication methods exist, magnetic-stripe data no longer presents a meaningful risk.

Chip authentication and magnetic-stripe reads address different acceptance paths. Full track or track-equivalent data remains sensitive authentication data regardless of the read method, and its handling is governed by the same storage prohibition. No single control eliminates fraud.

Best practices

Treat full magnetic-stripe (track) data as sensitive authentication data and ensure it is not retained after authorization, including in logs, debugging output, or temporary files, whether or not it is encrypted.

Distinguish in data-flow diagrams and data inventories between full track data (sensitive authentication data) and individual elements such as PAN that may be stored as cardholder data under defined controls.

Verify that any storage permitted for cardholder data elements applies only to those elements and not to full track or track-equivalent contents read from the stripe or chip.

Where PAN is retained, apply appropriate protection such as tokenization, truncation, masking, or hashing according to their intended use, and validate the resulting effect on scope rather than assuming it from the label alone.

Confirm the exact applicable PCI DSS requirement text and numbering against the current published standard, since wording and numbering differ between versions.

Include handling of magnetic-stripe data in staff training, incident response, and monitoring so that inadvertent capture or retention of track data is detected and remediated.